The International Monetary Fund's (hereafter IMF or Fund) use of conditionality is highly controversial. Critics claim IMF conditionality has a one-size-fits-all logic that constrains the policy options available to borrowing countries (Easterly 2001; Stiglitz 2002; Gabor 2010; Weisbrot et al. 2009; Van Waeyenberge et al. 2010; Rainer and Raudla 2013) .
Others direct similar criticisms toward bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade and investment (Wade 2003; Gallagher 2005; Shadlen 2005; Grabel 2010; Broad and Cavanagh 2014) . These criticisms share a concern that these institutions are infused with a normative bias that has severely limited the space for alternative policy goals in developing countries.
Some emerging market officials share this view as well as a perception that IMF conditionality, with its alleged bias toward Western interests, tends to be applied in an uneven manner.
1 Countries of importance to the West are perceived to receive favourable treatment, while others receive tougher conditions. Recent IMF lending to countries in the Eurozone has only served to heighten such criticisms and negative perceptions. Questions about the potential biases associated with IMF conditionality, and more broadly about the behavior of international organizations (IOs), are thus of much importance to scholars and policymakers.
For scholars, questions about the behaviour of international organizations are situated within a broader debate between rationalists and constructivists (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins et al 2006) . Rationalists and constructivists both see potential biases arising the policies of IOs, but they highlight different sources of such behavior. While rationalists emphasize the material interests and incentives of shareholders, borrowing countries, and organizational staff, constructivists tend to highlight the worldviews and norms of these actors. Notwithstanding some recent constructivist inroads, rationalism tends to be the predominant approach in the now extensive literature on IMF conditionality (Steinwand and Stone 2008) . This scholarship often attributes preferential treatment found in IMF conditionality to the geopolitical and economic interests of powerful shareholders (Dreher and Jensen 2007; Kang 2007; Stone 2008; Copelovitch 2010) .
Along with the interests of powerful shareholders, the IMF staff also exercise a great deal of influence over the design of conditionality (Mussa and Savastano 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Martin 2006) . The key judgment the staff make in designing conditionality is assessing the credibility of a borrowing country's intentions to fulfil its policy commitments. Here rationalist arguments focus solely on the technocratic considerations or organizational imperatives motivating staff judgments.
I argue that the manner in which the IMF staff evaluate the credibility of borrowing country policy commitments is subject to a range of influences, including but not limited to considerations and imperatives featured in rationalist accounts. Building on constructivist analyses of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005b; Broome 2010; Chwieroth 2010 ), I contribute a new argument on the determinants of conditionality that emphasizes the normative orientations of the IMF staff. I contend that a borrowing country's affinity for the IMF staff's normative orientations shapes the binding nature of conditionality. As such, the argument here extends Woods (2006) suggestion that conditionality is partly shaped by the adherence of borrowing country officials to IMF norms.
The international normative environment is an important influence on the design of conditionality (Pop-Eleches 2008; . In addition to technocratic considerations and organizational imperatives, the judgments of the IMF staff also reflect their normative orientations, which are heavily influenced by their common professional training from Anglo-American economic departments (Babb 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Woods 2006 ). This common training helps to instil the IMF staff with a particular way of understanding the policies necessary to stabilize economies, providing at least one mechanism through which professional ties emerge among actors. As Cortell and Peterson observe (2006:260) , "staff who share a common professional identity are likely…to develop a similar 'logic of appropriateness' as their professional roles become the lenses through which they view the IO's [international organization] mandate."
Professional ties emerging from common training thus inform how the staff evaluate the credibility of borrowing country policy commitments. Weak professional ties undermine staff confidence that the government shares their normative orientations. When borrowing country officials appear unsympathetic to the staff's normative orientations, and thus demonstrating a weaker commitment to IMF policy goals, the staff may perceive a greater need to make any policy adjustments explicitly binding. Weaker normative adherence to IMF policy goals thus induces more stringent conditionality. By raising the costs of reneging on IMF policy goals, tighter conditionality provides a stronger commitment device to shape the direction of policy reform.
I use a dataset of the professional training characteristics of over 200 IMF staff members and over 400 officials from 32 developing country officials to test this argument.
The results provide strong evidence that professional ties shape the binding nature of IMF conditionality. In cases where professional ties between the staff and borrowing country officials are weak, countries receive more binding conditions in their IMF programs.
However, stronger professional tries do not lead to more lenient treatment. Staff concerns about time-inconsistency and moral hazard may offset the inclination to provide preferential treatment where normative adherence is stronger.
PROFESSIONAL TIES AND BINDING CONDITIONALITY
Scholarship on IOs is often situated as divided between rationalists and constructivists. In explaining the motivations of shareholders, borrowing countries, and organizational staff, rationalist approaches tend to focus on material interests and incentives.
While insightful, these arguments tend to suffer from one of two shortcomings. The first is to ignore staff preferences entirely, focusing instead on the political interests and structures of shareholder and borrowing countries. The second shortcoming is to account for staff preferences only with reference to technocratic considerations or organizational imperatives.
The literature on IMF lending, which is largely rationalist in orientation, has not been immune to these shortcomings. Existing scholarship, which highlights technocratic considerations (Bird and Rowlands 2003; Martin 2006:142) , the geopolitical and economic interests of powerful states (Dreher and Jensen 2007; Kang 2007; Stone 2008; Copelovitch 2010) , domestic political features (Vreeland 2003) as well as organizational imperatives within the IMF (Willett 2002; Dreher and Vaubel 2004) , provides few answers as to how the normative orientations of the staff may shape the design of IMF conditionality.
The argument here aims to rectify this shortcoming in the literature by highlighting the importance of the worldviews and norms of those on either side of an IMF loan. I offer a conditional theory of how normative adherence to IMF policy goals informs staff judgments about the credibility of a borrowing country's policy commitments, and hence the design of conditionality.
Country representatives on the IMF Executive Board approve all loans, but they have delegated considerable authority and agenda-setting power in designing conditionality to the staff (Mussa and Savastano 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004) . The Board considers only those loans that the staff have designed and submitted to them, and it has almost never rejected or modified a loan proposal (Southard 1979; Martin 2006) . Of course, as Stone (2008; and others (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Kang 2007; Copelovitch 2010; Breen, 2012) it rarely makes any changes to the features agreed by the area department mission (Mussa and Savastano 1999:12) .
The literature identifies two primary determinants of staff preferences: technocratic considerations and organizational imperatives. The former sees macroeconomic conditions determining the design of conditionality (Bird and Rowlands 2003) . The latter views staff incentives to maximize their resources or the likelihood of program success as a leading determinant of conditionality (Willett 2002; Dreher and Vaubel 2004) . When demand for IMF resources grows, the staff may use this as an opportunity to gain greater influence through more stringent conditionality. Alternatively, the staff may engage in "hurry up" lending during reviews of the organization's financing capacity as a way to generate pressure on its member states to provide it with more resources. Such lending may lead to the relaxation of conditionality so as to entice more borrowers.
Much of this literature omits another possibility, which is that the normative orientations found in the IMF's organizational culture may also be an important determinant of the design of conditionality (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005b) . The shared socializing experience of professional training in Anglo-American economics departmentswhich rests of a theoretical core stressing market efficiency and rationality -has helped instil in the Fund staff a shared way of forming policy judgments (Babb 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005a; Woods 2006; Chwieroth 2010) . Common professional training exposes and socializes individuals to particular technical knowledge (causal understandings) and normative conceptualizations (standards of behaviour) by promoting, both implicitly and explicitly, a particular set of beliefs. "Professional training," observe Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:905) , "does more than simply transfer technical knowledge, it actively socializes people to value certain things above others."
These technical knowledge and normative conceptualizations -which Johnston (2005) calls "cognitive worldviews" and "constitutive norms" -provide a common lens through which IMF economists develop shared diagnoses about the problems economies face, the kinds of information relevant to understanding these problems, and the array of possible and appropriate policies to remedy them. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983:153) professional training there might be some individuals who were socialized into these beliefs and others whose prior beliefs led them to self-select into particular academic programs.
Yet even those individuals who did self-select into particular academic programs were likely exposed to new technical knowledge and normative conceptualizations that, at the very least, reinforced their prior beliefs or led them to extend their beliefs in a way they had not yet considered. Over time the belief structure of these individuals likely became increasingly robustly embedded in a particular set of shared beliefs, with such beliefs being constantly reshaped and redefined via interaction with other members of the group who shared them.
Moreover, while it would be an overstatement to claim that common professional training produces a set of completely homogenous beliefs within the IMF, it, along with organizational procedures encouraging conformity, have helped create a common set of general assumptions about "how things are done" within the IMF that are generally shared by most staff.
I argue that the staff draw on their common professional training to design conditionality. This training shapes the contours of the adjustments that the staff are likely to view as necessary to encourage more disciplined macroeconomic policies and to remove structural impediments to economic growth. The Fund staff thus believe that program success is dependent on certain policies.
When a government requests an IMF program the staff must assess the credibility of its policy intentions in forming their expectations and making judgments about how to design conditionality.
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Governments face a time-inconsistency problem. Even governments that want to implement policy reforms -and therefore have a long-run incentive to pursue such measures -face incentives to renege on these intentions and assume greater risk in order to achieve short-term political or economic objectives. Thus, the staff must evaluate a government's policy intentions as well as the credibility of these intentions, and consider how this shapes the potential for moral hazard.
Here professional ties may make this task easier as it communicates that the policy team may (or may not) have some affinity for the IMF's policy goals and thus have stronger How might the IMF staff treat borrowers where professional ties with government officials appear stronger? Woods (2006) suggests the IMF may be inclined to support sympathetic interlocutors in borrowing countries. Others go further by arguing that the IMF plays favorites by providing preferential treatment in the design of conditionality to those countries whose officials share the organization's policy preferences (Nelson 2014b ).
Credible commitment arguments suggest that borrowing country officials that share the policy beliefs of the IMF would require fewer constraints. Hence, one might conjecture that the Fund would be inclined to treat borrowers more leniently where professional ties are stronger.
The presence of these similarly trained officials may communicate that the government shares the IMF's policy goals and thus can be trusted to follow the IMF's preferred set of policies. Chwieroth (2013a) , for instance, finds that the IMF provides larger loans to countries where government officials share professional ties with the staff. If this logic also applies to policy conditionality, then we would expect the Fund to provide loans with fewer binding conditions to borrowers where country officials share stronger professional ties with the staff.
TESTING THE ARGUMENT
In this section, I assess how professional ties shape the design of IMF conditionality.
The data set comprises annual data on 81 IMF non-concessional loans extended to 22
developing countries from 1983 to 1998 under the Stand-By and Extended Fund Facility programs.
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I measure conditionality using a count of the number of binding conditions included in an IMF program when it is first approved. These data, which originate from Copelovitch (2010) , provide a widely used measure of the overall stringency of conditionality (Gould 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Stone 2011; Breen 2012 ).
I focus on performance criteria, which are the most binding form of conditionality.
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These criteria are mandatory quantitative or structural conditions, such as limits on government debt or privatising state-owned enterprises, which borrowers must be implement to access IMF resources. In the data set the mean number of performance criteria included in IMF loans has shown little variation over time (approximately six). However, there has been notable divergence across various borrowers, with the number ranging from 0 to 14.
I use data from Chwieroth (2013a) to test the argument. Measuring policy beliefs is a challenging task, and my approach (Chwieroth 2007; 2013a) and that of others (Kogut and MacPherson 2008; Weymouth and MacPherson 2012) has been to use the professional training characteristics of policymakers as a proxy for normative consensus. While there may be better approaches for capturing shared beliefs, such as direct surveys of IMF and country officials, these are empirically near impossible. However, there is abundant evidence from surveys of economists that provides support for the validity of this approach, as it reveals common professional training to be an important socializing experience in generating shared beliefs (Colander and Klamer 1987; Klamer and Colander 1990; Colander 2008; Fourcade 2009 ). This evidence also shows that even though consensus does not extend to all areas of 5 Data availability constraints on IMF staff profiles prevent the time-series of the analysis from extending beyond 1998. However, this time frame does permit analysis of the period when the IMF was most active in its lending to developing countries. Countries in the conditionality regression include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Uruguay and Venezuela. The full data set, which includes countries that did not borrow from the IMF, comprises 443 observations and 32 countries. This larger sample is used in the program participation specification. 6 I also sought to explore the determinants of the number of prior actions, another element of IMF conditionality. However, a large number of countries had programs where the number of prior actions equals zero. As a result, the use of fixed effects reduced the sample size to a number where the models would not converge.
economics, that there tends to be less variation in beliefs among Anglo-American economists compared to that between Anglo-American-trained economists and those trained elsewhere, particularly as it relates to a theoretical core based on assumptions about rational and efficient markets.
The data from Chwieroth (2013) I also take into account organizational imperatives, which may lead the IMF to provide more lenient conditions when it has more resources available and when its member states are undertaking a quota review that could boost its resources.
To address these possibilities I use the IMF's liquidity ratio, which is the sum of outstanding loans divided by total quota resources, and a dummy variable indicating the years in which a quota review is underway. These data are from Dreher and Vaubel (2004) . Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables, including those used in the robustness checks discussed below.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
I also take into account the issue of non-random selection, which arises from the fact that countries participating in IMF programs are systematically different than the overall population (Steinwand and Stone 2008) . I employ propensity score matching as a way to match each "treated" observation (a country-year with an IMF program) with a "control" observation (a country-year without an IMF program) based on the observed covariates that are as similar as possible. This "nearest neighbour" algorithm generates a propensity score for each observation ranging from zero to one. Inclusion of this propensity score, which captures the predicted probability of IMF program participation, helps to minimize selection bias I also take into account temporal dependence by using the country-specific number of years since the last IMF program, its square, and its cube (Carter and Signorino 2010) . 11 In the conditionality specification I replace this measure with an alternative one that captures the number of years since a country last borrowed from the IMF, which controls for potential temporal dependence in event count models (Beck et al. 1998 ).
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
I estimate a logit model to produce the propensity scores included in the subsequent conditionality specification. Then, since the data do not show evidence of overdispersion, I use a Poisson model with country fixed effects and robust standard errors to estimate the conditionality specification. Table 2 presents the results.
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I first present a baseline model, in which I exclude the professional characteristics variables. I then introduce the professional characteristics variables in subsequent models.
Models 1 and 2 explore the pattern of IMF program participation. While there is an extensive literature on the subject, it is a less theoretically appropriate dependent variable since requests for financing are rarely rejected. Macroeconomic factors related to large public sector debt burdens appear to influence country participation in IMF loans. Professional ties between the staff and borrowing country officials, U.S. geopolitical and financial interests, and organizational imperatives do not appear significant at the selection stage.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 report the results of alternative specifications of the conditionality regressions. Some of the control variables are significant in the expected direction. The IMF appears less likely to impose stringent conditionality when a borrower government faces more veto players. There is also evidence that organizational imperatives surrounding quota reviews increase the stringency of conditionality, which may be due to 11 The results are similar for the program participation specification if I instead use the cubic splines approach of Beck et al. (1998) ; and for the subsequent conditionality specification if I instead: (1) exclude the propensity score; (2) include a count of the number of years; (3) include a measure of debt outstanding to the IMF as a proportion of a country's IMF quota; and (4) include year fixed effects. 12 The results of the country fixed effects are not shown.
efforts on the part of the staff to present themselves as a responsible manager of IMF resources (Copelovitch 2010:62n33 (Copelovitch, 2010) . None of the other control variables manage to attain statistical significance.
The results do provide strong support for the argument offered here. As expected, the results from Model 4 indicate that the coefficient on Anglo-American staff variable is positively and significantly related to the number of performance criteria. However since it appears in this specification as an interaction with Anglo-American policy team, it is difficult to assess the magnitude and significance of its effect from the coefficient alone. The preferred method to interpret the effect of interaction terms and the constitutive variables is through graphical presentation of the relationship between changes in the variables constituting the interaction term and the outcome of interest (Brambor et al. 2006; Berry et al. 2012 ).
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
I therefore use In each of these cases the staff applied strict treatment to government officials, with whom they shared few professional ties, because of doubts as to their commitment to IMF policy goals (Boughton, 2001; Momani, 2004 While larger loans carry rejection costs that provide an incentive for any present or future government to act in accordance with IMF policy goals (Vreeland 2003) , more lenient conditionality would provide a government with greater capacity to act independently and thus assume additional risk since the conditionality contract could not be easily rewritten. In addition, reformist officials sharing IMF policy goals may oppose more lenient treatment as a way of binding the opposition (both in the present and the future) (Vreeland 2003) . These influences thus weigh against more lenient treatment for borrowers where officials appear sympathetic to IMF policy goals, thus offsetting the effect of stronger normative adherence.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
As a result, we observe stronger professional ties having no statistically or substantively significant effect on the design of conditionality.
The IMF negotiations with Indonesia in the late 1990s provide an empirical example.
Here, despite shared professional ties, rather than providing more lenient treatment, IMF and some country officials worked together to design a loan that would bind opposing elements in the government to policy reform and that led the number of binding conditions to conform to other loans provided at the time (Stone, 2011: 170-173; IEO, 2003:12-13) . 14 This suggests that while the IMF staff prioritize their normative orientations, they also give due consideration to other concerns that may weigh against providing more lenient treatment.
The IMF staff and borrowing country officials may also share a preference for limiting the scope for future governments to abandon their policy goals (Vreeland 2003) .
As suggested earlier, much of the existing literature depicts IMF conditionality as a reflection of preferences of powerful member states and IMF management. Thus, it is worth considering the extent to which these findings may reflect these preferences. Management, which is often seen as agent of powerful member states, may be broadly supportive of conditionality designed on the basis identified in the results, but it also faces additional incentives to seek excessive insurance against failure in all programs (Willett 2002 ). This may bias management to err on the side of working to streamline conditionality so as to increase the likelihood of program success, even in cases where professional ties are weak.
Thus, if management does err on the side of seeking to encourage the staff to limit conditionality for all borrowers, the results are inconsistent with this expectation. However, the results are in line with Momani's (2005b) finding that management efforts to streamline conditionality prior to the recent global financial crisis failed largely due to their lack of resonance with the organization's normative orientations.
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Powerful states, for their part, are likely to be broadly supportive of using conditionality to encourage policy reform, particularly in cases where the intentions of country officials do not appear to align with the policy goals of the IMF and where their geopolitical and financial interests are less intense. For instance, some suggest that during 14 In Indonesia (1997/1998), Anglo-American staff was 60/65 and Anglo-American policy team was 66.6/66.6. The IMF approved loans with 10 (1997) and 9 (1998) binding conditions that showed little deviation from those loans provided to the mean borrowing country during the Asian financial crisis. 15 The IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2007b:24) also finds 'there is no evidence of a reduction in the number of structural conditions following the introduction of the streamlining initiative.' the Cold War socialist and leftist governments received tougher conditionality (Hayter 1971; Payer 1974) . Thus, in some countries, the influence and inclination of powerful countries and the staff to apply more stringent conditionality may co-exist and be difficult to disentangle. The strong version of this argument is that powerful countries push the staff to tighten conditionality against "unfavourable" governments, while the weak version of this argument is that the staff take into account the preferences of powerful states and then act in accordance with them.
I use various measures of the intensity of member state preferences as way to help disentangle their impact on staff behaviour. Using these measures there is at best weak evidence to support the conjecture that the results partially reflect statist influence to discriminate against "unfavourable" governments in countries where the interests of powerful states are weak. In the sample there are 59 cases in which Anglo-American staff takes on a higher value (above its median) and Anglo-American policy team takes on values at the low end of its distribution where the effect is significant in Figure 2 . These cases cluster in Latin America (37 cases) and the Middle East and North Africa (12 cases), with Uruguay (1997), Venezuela (1996) , Egypt (1996) and Jordan (1996) as recent examples. Yet most of these cases are not particularly collinear with weak U.S. geopolitical and financial interests. U.S.
geopolitical interests, as measured by the U.N. voting affinity measure, are weak (in the first quartile) in only fourteen of the 59 cases, while its financial interests are of low intensity, including one where its geopolitical interests are also weak, in only nine of the 59 cases.
The voting affinity measure also likely overstates the number of cases in which U.S.
geopolitical interests are actually weak, since a number of these cases, such as Egypt (1991) and the Philippines (1986 Philippines ( , 1986 Philippines ( , 1989 Philippines ( , 1991 Philippines ( , and 1998 , play important roles in U.S. foreign policy but generally vote against it in the U.N. General Assembly (Stone 2011:165-166) . In many of the cases where professional ties are weak it is thus easier to conclude that staff motivations for seeking reform may be stronger than statist pressure to impose more binding conditionality. In fact, in some of these cases, such as Egypt, U.S. officials insisted, despite staff objections, for greater leniency to be given in the design of conditionality (Momani 2004 ).
I also carry out a number of tests to assess the robustness of these results. First, I
consider alternative measures of U.S. interests that feature in the literature, such as U.S.
military aid, economic aid, and exports. 16 Second, I also consider measures of the geopolitical and financial interests of other leading IMF member states, including Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. Third, following Achen (2005) , I consider a reduced-form specification that includes only the two control variables that were found to be significant in Table 2 . As Table 4 shows, the sign and significance of the Anglo-American staff coefficient does not change in any of these specifications.
I also assess whether the results may be contingent on regime type. I use two different measures of democracy; one from Polity IV, another from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (CGV) (2009) to identify regime type. I then divide the sample into democratic and non-democratic countries, which greatly depletes the number of observations and only permits estimation of the reduced-form specification. The results from this limited examination provide some evidence that the finding holds in both democratic and nondemocratic regimes.
Taken together, all of these results provide strong confirmation that the design of IMF conditionality depends in part on the extent to which staff and borrowing country officials share professional ties. These results are in line with the arguments offered here.
Normative adherence appears to be a crucial determinant of conditionality, particularly in borrowers where country officials seem unsympathetic to IMF policy goals.
CONCLUSION
Much of the recent literature on IMF conditionality has focused on shining light on the degree to which member states exert influence over IMF lending. Yet, while insightful, this literature often provides a somewhat narrow depiction of the role the staff play in designing IMF programs. When their role is considered, in most cases the staff are depicted either as technocrats who design programs based on economic models and data, or as bureaucratic actors who respond to organizational imperatives.
While not denying the importance of these factors, this article offers a new argument and evidence that points to the IMF's organizational culture and staff professional training as also having a critical influence on the design of IMF programs. Others have investigated various related questions about organizational culture and the inner workings of the IMF, but we thus far have little systematic analysis as to how these factors shape the design of conditionality. This article shows that weak professional ties between the staff and borrowing country officials lead to the application of more stringent conditionality. Yet, interestingly, professional ties, while helping to bind individuals together around a set of shared beliefs, do not make the application of conditionality less binding. Staff concerns about time-inconsistency and moral hazard may offset the inclination to play favorites due to stronger normative adherence.
These findings have several important implications for studies of IMF conditionality and IOs more generally. First, it extends the body of literature that takes seriously the role of organizational culture and internal dynamics as an important influence on IO behaviour (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2005b; Weaver 2008; Broome 2010; Chwieroth 2010) . It moves beyond simply asserting "professional identity matters" by identifying some mechanisms through which it is likely to be influential.
Second, with its emphasis on normative orientations and cultural predispositions, rather than formal rules and procedures, this study also contributes to the recent behavioural turn in the study of IOs that emphasizes informal governance (Stone 2011; Kleine 2013 ).
The analysis here shows that informal governance operates in IOs not, as much of this recent behavioural literature suggests, simply via state influence but also through the evolving configuration, incentive structure, and normative orientations of their staffs. The analysis also confirms the logic of arguments about the manner in which epistemic communities Organization and the World Trade Organization. Although previous research demonstrates that professional ties shape the content of these organization's policy prescriptions (Cortell and Peterson 2006) , this study suggests these ties may also influence terms by which they interact with member states. 17 For instance, professional ties may bias the forecasts of these and other IOs in the same way that member state interests and other factors have been shown to shape those of the IMF (Dreher et al. 2008) .
A third, related implication is that normative orientations condition the relationship between IOs and domestic policy reform. The intrusiveness of IMF conditionality is in a part of function of the normative orientations of the staff and borrowing country officials.
These orientations thus play an important part in strengthening our understanding of how IOs shape economic and political outcomes by empowering reformers and marginalizing opponents (Vreeland 2003; Woods 2006; Dai 2010) .
The findings here also speak to policy discussions about the IMF. Critics of the IMF are likely to view the findings as supporting their claim that conditionality is biased in its application of a one-size-fits-all logic that lacks sensitivity to contextual features varying across borrowers. To the extent that conditionality is more stringent for borrowers with officials who appear unsympathetic to IMF policy goals, then it suggests conditionality may suffer from a normative bias and that the policy space of some borrowers may therefore be unduly more severely constrained than others.
The findings here suggest this asymmetric treatment may not, as is commonly depicted, result from statist influence alone. Normative orientations and cultural dispositions of the IMF also appear important. These orientations and dispositions may be consistent with the interests of powerful states but this does not mean they are attributable solely to them. As Woods (2006:56) were once considered heresy (Grabel 2011; . 18 As such, the argument here would lead us to expect greater flexibility in IMF lending to the extent that the Fund has broadened the range of policy goals it deems appropriate.
In fact, since the onset of the crisis the IMF has reduced the number of structural conditions in its loans (IMF 2011b; 2011c) .
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While the number of quantitative performance criteria has remained stable since 2002, the discontinuation of structural performance criteria in 2009 has led to some progress in streamlining conditionality.
Nonetheless, the number and depth of conditions in loans to Eurozone countries (especially Greece) has increased compared to other recent borrowers.
In addition to the interests of powerful shareholders, such as Germany, the involvement of the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), which together with the IMF form the so called "Troika," has complicated the design of conditionality and financial rescue packages in the Eurozone. The IMF, as the junior partner contributing the smallest share of resources, has had to coordinate with these actors and work to accommodate their preferences. Among these various actors, Germany, the Commission, and the ECB have offered much stronger support of "Washington Consensus"-style policies than the IMF staff (Lütz and Kranke 2013) . The IMF's lending policies in the Europe (and elsewhere) have been more flexible and, at least compared to past crises and to those policies endorsed by key actors in Europe, also less contractionary (IMF 2009; 2011a ; see also Edwards and Hsieh 2011; Kattel and Raudla 2013:432fn13; 440; Lütz and Kranke 2013) .
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The Fund has not adopted an "anything goes" orientation in the Eurozone or elsewhere, and the extent of its normative change remains tentative and piecemeal (Weisbrot et al. 2009; Van Waeyenberge et al. 2010; Grabel 2011 ). Staff and Interlocutors, 1980 1980 -1989 -IMF 1990 -IMF 1980 -1989 -Policy Team 1990 IMF conditionality, 1983 IMF conditionality, -1998 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
